[mythtv] mythvideo DB enhancement

buzz davidbuzz at gmail.com
Fri Jan 11 01:03:23 UTC 2008


disallowing .. and allowing / ?
It's a falacy that security can be implemented by "removing the dangerous",
it's much better to just "allow the safe".

If you limit it to alpha-numeric+forwardslash characters (essentially
dissallowing the rest of the ASCII character set, and any UTF or
characterset encoded stuff, etc), and ensure that it always starts with the
SG directory (ie can't start from the root directory by mistake), then you
can be more assured(not 100%, but "more") of safety than by any "dissallow
this specific character" method.

Buzz.
On Jan 11, 2008 10:45 AM, Peter Schachte <schachte at csse.unimelb.edu.au>
wrote:

> Stuart Auchterlonie wrote:
>
> > Firstly i'll say it's theoretical and unlikely, but the general theory
> > with these goes along the lines of the following.
> >
> > Say your SG directory is /myth/rec/
> >
> > if the code allows / then the attacker would request the file called
> >
> > ../../etc/passwd
> >
> > which when you string it together becomes
> >
> > /myth/rec/../../etc/passwd = /etc/passwd
>
> How about not allowing '..' rather than not allowing '/' ?  Then you could
> use subdirectories within SGs without danger.
>
> --
> Peter Schachte              I worry that 10 or 15 years from now, [my
> child]
> schachte at cs.mu.OZ.AU        will come to me and say 'Daddy, where were you
> www.cs.mu.oz.au/~schachte/  when they took freedom of the press away from
> Phone: +61 3 8344 1338      the Internet?' -- Mike Godwin
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